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A BABY STEP: THE STATUS OF
SURROGACY LAW IN WISCONSIN
FOLLOWING ROSECKY V. SCHISSEL
Surrogacy is an ancient and rapidly expanding industry in the United
States and abroad. Despite this, the legal landscape governing surrogacy
contracts remains tenuous in a majority of states—including Wisconsin.
In 2013, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took the first step in developing
surrogacy contract law in Wisconsin. Absent legislative guidance, the
court fashioned a reasonable foundation for surrogacy contracts.
However, its decision does little to ensure that intending parents and
surrogate mothers who enter into such agreements fully understand their
responsibilities and have assurances that their expectations will be met.
This Comment does not seek to argue, as many others have, the merits of
surrogacy or the limitations the law should place on the practice. Rather,
it seeks to illustrate the Rosecky decision’s place within the legal
landscape and suggest one provisions that could form a foundation for
much needed legislative guidance.
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INTRODUCTION

The story is rare but not uncommon. A couple longs to have a child,
but as the result of illness, injury, or fate, the intending mother is unable
to successfully carry a child. After years of heartache, the closest of
friends expresses a desire to help. The hopeful parents have known the
friend for many years. The close friend and her husband have already
created their family and routinely stated that they were done having
children.
After several months, or even years, the intending parents agree to
allow the friend to be the surrogate mother for their child. Although
the parties are the closest of friends, the intending parents are not
foolish and realize conflicts can arise. As a result, they contact a local
attorney to learn the best course of action; the friend does the same and
hires her own attorney.
The attorneys explain that surrogacy contracts are commonplace and
the parties were wise to seek one in case disagreements should arise.
However, the attorneys also clarify that there is no law governing such
agreements in Wisconsin; there are no guidelines or requirements for
the drafting of a surrogacy contract. Despite their desire to take
precautions, the best the attorneys can do is draft a comprehensive and
reasonable agreement between the parties. An agreement is drafted
based on what other states have found to be acceptable, and after
healthy discussions, the group settles on an agreement that outlines the
responsibilities of all the parties and explains that the child will be
placed with the intended parents.
In vitro fertilization is used with the intending father providing the
sperm and the egg provided by the surrogate mother.1 The parties are
overjoyed when they learn the procedure was successful and that in a
few short months the hopeful parents will finally be able to start their
family.
As the months go on the intending parents’ friendship with the
surrogate mother begins to unravel. By the time the child is born, the
1. In vitro means “outside the body.” The process involves the application of fertility
drugs to the egg donor and retrieval of several eggs. An egg is then maintained in a container
and fertilized with the sperm. The fertilized egg develops into an embryo, which is then
placed into the woman three to five days after fertilization. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF),
MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007279.htm (last updated
Mar. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/58Z9-MJPZ; Tests and Procedures: In Vitro
Fertilization, MAYO CLINIC (June 27, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vi
tro-fertilization/basics/definition/prc-20018905, archived at http://perma.cc/N857-7D3B.
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relationship has deteriorated to the point that the once good friend no
longer wishes to surrender the child to the intended parents. Perhaps
the surrogate mother no longer believed the family would be best for
the child, or perhaps she simply could not surrender the child as she
once believed she could. Regardless, there is no resolution in sight and
litigation ensues.
The intending parents, armed with the carefully crafted agreement,
head to court to show the judge they are the rightful parents. However,
the legal landscape of Wisconsin is uncharted, and the surrogate mother
argues that such agreements are void under public policy. Much to the
dismay of the intended parents, the judge states he will not consider the
agreement. Further, though the court awards sole custody and
placement with the intended parents, he allows for the surrogate mother
to have the child every other weekend. Finally, the surrogate mother
will not be forced to terminate her parental rights—the intending
mother cannot adopt the child as originally planned.
Surrogacy is an age-old practice, and a rapidly expanding industry
both in the United States and abroad. Despite this history, the legal
landscape of surrogacy—and more specifically surrogacy contracts—is
far from settled. Wisconsin, like a majority of states, had no legal
guidelines to govern surrogacy contracts prior to 2013, when the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled such agreements were generally
enforceable.2 In Wisconsin, deep divides over the morals of surrogacy
prevented governing legislation from being passed in the late 1980s.3
Since that time, the issue has largely remained dormant on both the
legislative and judicial fronts despite the fact the practice of surrogacy
has continued to grow.4
The disturbing result of the legislature’s failure to pass meaningful
legislation is that parties who seek surrogacy as an alternative to
adoption have been left unable to adequately plan in a manner to ensure
expectations are met. In Rosecky v. Schissel, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that surrogacy contracts were valid under Wisconsin public
policy and that such agreements should be considered in determining
custody and placement of a child, provided that the agreement does not
conflict with the best interests of the child.5 Though a landmark
2.
3.
4.
5.

Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 30, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part II.
Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 74.
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decision that validated surrogacy in Wisconsin, far more questions are
left to be answered. This Comment will argue that only through
comprehensive legislation can families have the clarity necessary to
effectively and reliably plan for their futures.
This Comment will argue that ensuring family planning is too vital
for clarity to develop via case law. Comprehensive legislation must be
passed to ensure that when intending parents and surrogate mothers
enter into agreements all parties fully understand their responsibilities
and have assurances that their expectations will be enforced by the legal
system. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of surrogacy
contracts and prominent cases that highlight the competing views, which
have led to a lack of uniformity in surrogacy laws across the United
States. Part III will detail the Rosecky decision and analyze the court’s
reasoning along with Chief Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence. Part IV
will briefly analyze examples of legislation used in other states: first, the
model rule of Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act will be examined,
followed by California’s permissive approach to surrogacy contracts
and, finally, Illinois’s 2004 Gestational Surrogacy Act. Part V will
summarize Wisconsin’s failed attempts at legislation to govern surrogacy
contracts. Finally, Part VI will analyze questions that remain following
the Rosecky decision and argue that the legal landscape following the
decision should provide ample incentive for parties on both sides of the
surrogacy debate to press for meaningful legislation. Part VI does not
argue for what restrictions, if any, should be placed on surrogacy
contracts.
Rather, the Part highlights that, regardless of the
requirements, any surrogacy legislation should include a pre-birth
hearing to ensure conflicts are resolved before the birth of the child.
II. BACKGROUND OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Surrogacy is not a modern concept; it has been present in human
society as far back as the birth of Abraham’s son in the Old Testament.6
Abraham’s first wife Sarah was unable to bear children; thus, Abraham
took a second wife, and their resulting child, Ishmael, was raised by
Abraham and Sarah.7 With the growth of modern medicine there has

6. Genesis 16:1–4; Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other Means if
Necessary: The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements,
61 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 799 (2012). The Bible includes at least three examples of traditional
surrogacy. See Genesis 16:1–4, 16:15, 30:1–10.
7. See Genesis 17:18, 17:25–26.
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been an explosion in the use of surrogacy and subsequent litigation.8
The introduction of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), most
notably in vitro fertilization, has changed the landscape of surrogacy and
childbirth in general.9 With millions of couples unable to have children,
surrogacy has become an increasingly popular alternative to adoption;
likewise, surrogacy contracts have become an increasingly important
topic for courts and legislatures.10
Surrogacy can be broadly divided into two categories: traditional
surrogacy and gestational surrogacy.11 In traditional surrogacy, the
surrogate mother provides the egg and a male provides the sperm.12
Traditional surrogacy dates back thousands of years. In contrast,
gestational surrogacy is a more recent creation of medical technology:
the egg is provided from an individual other than the surrogate
mother.13 Therefore, in traditional surrogacy the surrogate mother has a
genetic connection to the child; in gestational surrogacy the surrogate
mother does not have a genetic connection.14
Non-commercial arrangements were often created between family
members and friends.15 The most common scenario involved a married
couple where the wife was unable to carry a child for medical reasons.16
Reliable statistics on these informal arrangements are nearly

8. Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 802; Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood:
Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV 605,
609 (2003); Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate,
A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as_surrogac
y_becomes_more_popular_legal_problems_proliferate/, archived at http://perma.cc/VDR9JB2J.
9. Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 799–800; Sonia Bychkov Green, Interstate Intercourse:
How Modern Assisted Reproductive Technologies Challenge The Traditional Realm of
Conflicts of Law, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 25, 28 (2009).
10. Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Surrogate Parenting
Agreement, 77 A.LR. 4th 70, 74–76 (1990).
11. Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 35, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634 (explaining
that the two broad categories of surrogacy can be divided into many subcategories);
Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801; Larkey, supra note 8, at 609–10.
12. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 35; Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801.
13. Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801; Larkey, supra note 8, at 610–11.
14. Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801.
15. Larkey, supra note 8, at 608; see Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International
Perspectives on Surrogate Motherhood: The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the
United States, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 557, 560 (1999).
16. Larkey, supra note 8, at 607.
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nonexistent.17 In more recent years, as social dynamics have changed,
surrogacy has become increasingly popular for same-sex couples and
single individuals.18
The first formal surrogacy contract was drafted in 1976, and the first
successful birth as a result of in vitro fertilization occurred in 1978.19
Not surprisingly, a commercial market for surrogacy, in particular
gestational surrogacy, developed and grew rapidly on the heels of these
advances.20 From 1976 to 1981, an estimated 100 children were born
under situations where a surrogacy contract was used.21 From 1981 to
1986, that number grew to over 500 children.22 Current statistics
estimate between 1,500 and 2,000 children are born every year under
surrogacy and surrogacy contract arrangements.23 Likewise, surrogacy
contracts grew in prominence to protect parties and solidify
expectations in both commercial and informal surrogacy arrangements.24
Surrogacy contracts typically included provisions that required the
surrogate mother to terminate her parental rights, provided that the
intended parents would assume legal custody over the child, and

17. MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY
IN AMERICA 6 (2010), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a
1m.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z6YJ-32KY.
18. MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 6 (expanded ed. 1990); Larkey,
supra note 8, at 608.
19. FIELD, supra note 18, at 5; George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 43, 44 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990);
Lawrence Van Gelder, Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, Is Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at B8.
20. Larkey, supra note 8, at 608; see HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 1–31 (1994) (discussing the growth of the surrogacy agency
industry from 1976 to 1994).
21. FIELD, supra note 18, at 5.
22. Id.
23. Rosmarie Tong, Surrogate Parenting, INTERNET ENCYC. PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.
edu/surr-par/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WX7K-D7KB; Lorraine
Ali, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 29 2008, 10:55 AM), http://www.news
week.com/curious-lives-surrogates-84469, archived at http://perma.cc/T99Q-2CGE. Accurate
statistics are almost impossible to compile because of a lack of reporting standards. Tong,
supra. The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology attempts to keep yearly totals, but
clinics are not obligated to report surrogacy births. Ali, supra. Though figures vary, the 1,500
to 2,000 estimate appears consistent with the American Society of Reproductive Medicine,
which reported 1,593 gestational surrogacy births in 2011. Joan Cary, Surrogate Births
Growing in Popularity, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-1009/health/ct-x-1009-surrogate-20131009_1_illinois-gestational-surrogacy-act-egg-options-shirl
ey-zager, archived at http://perma.cc/D2FH-ZBAM.
24. Larkey, supra note 8, at 608.
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clarified the rights and obligations of both parties.25 By-and-large, such
provisions have remained common in surrogacy contracts.26
Commercial surrogacy also involved payments from the intended
parents to the surrogate mother for her services.27 With the exception of
the moral debate over surrogacy and ART generally,28 payments to
surrogate mothers have become the most heavily debated area of
surrogacy.29
Payments to surrogate mothers have typically centered on living
expenses, medical expenses, and life insurance coverage.30 Commercial
surrogacy has developed into a booming industry in the United States
and internationally;31 numerous companies have also developed to

25. Id. Though such provisions are common, there are nearly endless variations that
could be included in such contracts. See FIELD, supra note 18, at 6.
26. See, e.g., Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 10 n.2, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634
(explaining provisions included in surrogacy contract).
27. Every state has a ban on “baby-selling,” and any compensation provided in
surrogacy contracts may not be in exchange for the child. FIELD, supra note 18, at 17. In
states that allow commercial surrogacy, any compensation paid to the surrogate mother
beyond reimbursement for various expenses is framed as compensation “for services,” such as
“use of the mother’s womb.” Id. at 17–18; SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE NEW FAMILIES? 30 (1994).
28. There are, of course, additional questions that arise in the surrogacy context—such
as if either party may terminate a pregnancy. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered
$10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (March 6, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogac
y-kelley-legal-battle/, archived at http://perma.cc/PJ5C-3HYN. I do not wish to downplay the
significance of additional questions that arise in surrogacy, but they are not the focus of this
Comment. Rather, such difficulties appear to highlight the need for more effective surrogacy
contracts.
29. Hugh V. McLachlan & J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the
Alleged Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 96 (2009); see FIELD, supra note 18, at 25–45 (discussing general
debate over ART and exploitation of women); RAE, supra note 27, at 29–76 (evaluating
common arguments for and against commercial surrogacy).
30. Larkey, supra note 8, at 608. Some studies comparing “for profit” compensation
and compensation for “reasonable expenses” have suggested that there may be very little
difference in the actual amounts received by the surrogate mother. Yukari Semba et al.,
Surrogacy: Donor Conception Regulation in Japan, 24 BIOETHICS 348, 355 (2010) (comparing
for profit surrogacy in the United States with compensation paid for “reasonable expenses” in
the United Kingdom).
31. Nita Bhalla & Mansi Thapliyal, As Surrogacy Industry Booms; India Seeks Controls,
NBC NEWS (Sep. 30, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/surrogacy-industrybooms-india-seeks-controls-8C11300035, archived at http://perma.cc/5L27-MC6U; Himanshi
Dhawann, Unregulated Surrogacy Industry Worth over $2bn Thrives Without Legal
Framework, TIMES INDIA (July 18, 2013, 2:29 AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.co
m/2013-07-18/india/40656818_1_commissioning-parents-surrogate-mother-17-lakh, archived at
http://perma.cc/F24X-VUXT; Emily Shire, The Newest Chinese Luxury Item: American
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connect surrogate mothers with intending parents.32 Surrogacy agencies
typically charge between $30,000 and $45,000 for a child, with the
surrogate mother receiving between $10,000 and $15,000 plus
expenses.33 The total costs of a surrogacy birth can double the charges.
A recent case from Tennessee noted the intending parents paid $42,000
in medical expenses and another $31,000 to the surrogate mother.34
Some states allow for commercial surrogacy; others allow only noncommercial surrogacy; and a handful of states have responded by
banning or penalizing such practices;35 however, the lack of uniformity
from state to state allows agencies and potential parents to freely
operate in permissive states.36 It is not uncommon for parties from

Surrogate Mothers, THE WEEK (Sep. 24, 2013), http://theweek.com/article/index/250052/thenewest-chinese-luxury-item-american-surrogate-mothers, archived at http://perma.cc/S9EAY2GH; see GUGUCHEVA, supra note 17, at 7 (explaining Center for Disease Control statistics
on clinics performing ART procedures).
32. For example, The Surrogacy Center, a surrogacy agency located in Madison
Wisconsin, was formed in 2002 and has assisted with over 100 surrogacy births. Welcome,
SURROGACY CTR., http://www.surrogacycenter.com/ (last visited June 15, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/NXP2-WRZT.
33. Bryn Williams-Jones, Commercial Surrogacy and the Redefinition of Motherhood,
2 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. (2002), http://jpsl.org/archives/commercial-surrogacy-and-redefinition-mo
therhood/, archived at http://perma.cc/L2TH-53X8; see GUGUCHEVA, supra note 17, at 26.
Compensation for surrogate mothers varies greatly depending on experience, age, medical
conditions, and medical procedures used. See, e.g., Surrogate Mother Compensation,
FERTILITY SOURCE COS., http://www.fertilitysourcecompanies.com/surrogacy/surrogatemother-compensation/ (last visited June 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XQH3-3423.
34. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 815 (Tenn. 2014). The In re Baby case is also notable
because it followed Wisconsin’s Rosecky decision and adopted a very similar approach. Id. at
831.
35. Arizona and the District of Columbia ban surrogacy contracts. ARIZ. REV. STAT
ANN. § 25-218 (2007); D.C. CODE §§ 16-401–02 (2012). Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, and
Nebraska void surrogacy contracts. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-2 (LexisNexis 2013); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (LexisNexis 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005); NEB.
REV. STAT § 25-21,200 (2008). Michigan and New York void and penalize surrogacy
contracts. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851 to .861 (West 2011); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 121–24 (Consol. 2009).
36. For example, North Dakota voids traditional surrogacy contracts but allows
gestational surrogacy. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-05, 14-20-62 (2009). Washington allows
surrogacy contracts but bans commercial surrogacy contracts. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 26.26.220 to .240 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014). Numerous other states allow and regulate
surrogacy contracts in various forms. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212–.213 (West 2012 & Supp.
2013); id. §§ 742.15–.16 (West 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25 (West 2009); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.754 to .762 (West 2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801 to -809 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159 to 165 (2008 & Supp. 2012). See generally Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A
State-By-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM.
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different states to meet in a third state in order to execute a surrogacy
contract.37
A. Early Cases
In 1988, surrogacy contracts burst onto the legal landscape via the
Baby M case decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court.38 The case
gained nationwide attention as it climbed through the New Jersey
courts.39 Baby M was so prevalent it even sparked a “made-fortelevision” movie and “tell-all book.”40 Baby M involved William and
Elizabeth Stern contracting with Mary Whitehead to serve as a
surrogate mother.41 The parties used traditional surrogacy with the
genetics of the child provided by Mr. Stern and Ms. Whitehead.42
Following the birth, Ms. Whitehead refused to turn the child over to the
Sterns.43
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the surrogacy contract was
in violation of New Jersey statutes and in violation of public policy.44
The court viewed the contract as an attempt to circumvent existing
statutes on adoption.45 Specifically, the court held that the surrogacy
contract violated New Jersey’s prohibition against paying or accepting

MITCHELL L. REV. 449 (2009) (surveying the large variety of approaches states have used to
address surrogacy contracts).
37. See Katherine Drabiak, Carole Wegner, Valita Fredland & Paul R. Heft, Ethics,
Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 300
(2007). As an example, a New Jersey man hired a lawyer to draft a surrogacy contract with a
South Carolina woman. Id. The parties met in Indiana to execute the agreement. Id.
38. Hansen, supra note 8.
39. See, e.g., Iver Peterson, Baby M’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1987, at A1.
40. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD & LORETTA SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, A MOTHER’S STORY:
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BABY M CASE (1989); Baby M (ABC Circle Films television movie
May 22, 1988).
41. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988). The Sterns had sought a child for
many years through adoption. Id. The parties ultimately were connected thorough the
Infertility Center of New York. Id.
42. Id. at 1235.
43. Id. at 1236–37. Mrs. Whitehead initially followed through with the arrangement but
fell into a deep depression shortly after turning over the child to the Sterns. Id. at 1237.
Believing Whitehead would again return the child, the Sterns allowed her to take Baby M.
Id.
44. Id. at 1240. The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically looked to New Jersey
Statutes sections 9:2-16, 9:2-17, 9:3-41, and 30:4C-23, which govern termination of parental
rights and voluntary surrender of a child. Id. at 1242.
45. Id. at 1246–47; Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 803–04.
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money in connection with an adoption.46 The court explained that the
same public policy concerns over “baby-buying” that had prompted the
state’s ban on paying or receiving money for adoption applied to
surrogacy contracts.47
The court’s public policy concerns also revolved around the
exchange of money for surrogacy.48 The court noted Ms. Whitehead
had not been represented by counsel and characterized a mother’s
signing of a surrogacy contract prior to an understanding of the bond
she will have with her child as “[not] totally voluntary” or “informed.”49
New Jersey’s long history of respecting the right to contract did not
mean such activities were beyond regulation or prohibition.50 The court
ultimately concluded that surrogacy contracts mandated separation of
the child from the mother, produced a form of adoption regardless of
the suitability of the intended parents, and completely ignored the best
interests of the child.51
Just five years after the Baby M case, the California Supreme Court
reached an opposite conclusion in Johnson v. Calvert.52 The divergent
opinions between the two courts have ultimately foreshadowed the
variety of approaches that have developed within the United States to
address surrogacy. Johnson v. Calvert involved gestational surrogacy:
the Calverts provided the sperm and egg and Johnson served as the
surrogate mother for payment of $10,000.53 The parties ultimately had a
falling out that resulted in Johnson demanding the remaining payments
or she would not terminate her parental rights.54 The subsequent
lawsuits resulted in both parties seeking to be declared the legal
parents.55

46. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (1985).
47. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248.
48. Id. at 1249–50.
49. Id. at 1248.
50. Id. at 1249 (“There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy.”)
51. Id. at 1250. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that surrogacy contracts
were a recent creation and “[t]he long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but
feared.” Id.
52. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
53. Id. at 778.
54. Id. The disagreement between the parties was twofold. The Calverts were
disgruntled that Johnson had failed to disclose she had suffered several stillbirths, and
Johnson argued the Calverts had not done enough to obtain the agreed-upon insurance
policy. Id.
55. Id.
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The California Supreme Court began by noting that both the act of
physically giving birth and blood tests showing genetic relation were
acceptable forms of proving maternity under California law.56 Because
both parties had presented acceptable proof of maternity, the court
turned to the intentions of the parties in order to determine the parental
rights of the child.57 The court was clear that the agreement between the
parties was for Johnson to carry and relinquish the child to the Calverts
after the birth.58 It emphasized that, although all three parties were
necessary for the child to be born, the Calverts were the “prime
movers[] of the procreative relationship,” and it was their intent that
brought about the child.59
Unlike in Baby M, the court ruled that gestational surrogacy differed
significantly from adoption and, thus, adoption statutes did not provide
an adequate framework for the court’s decision.60 The court found that
surrogacy contracts were not contrary to public policy because
“[h]onoring the plans and expectations of adults who will be responsible
for a child’s welfare is likely to correlate significantly with positive
outcomes for parents and children alike.”61

56. Id. at 781.
57. Id. at 782. Under California Civil Code sections 7003, 7004, and 7015, proof of being
a birthmother and blood tests were both sufficient evidence to prove maternity. Id. at 781.
However California law only allowed for one “natural” mother despite the ability for conflict.
Id. Former sections 7003, 7004, and 7015 were updated in 1992 and 1993. Act of July 26,
1993, ch. 219, sec. 63, 1993 Cal. Stat. 1576, 1579; Act of July 11, 1992, ch. 162, sec. 4, 1992 Cal.
Stat. 463, 464.
58. Id. at 782.
59. Id. (quoting John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 415 (1991)) (internal
quotation mark omitted). The “intent test” or “intent as a major factor” has remained
California’s approach to surrogacy contracts and has been adopted elsewhere. See In re
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (upholding intending
parents as lawful parents of child despite the fact they had no genetic connection to the child);
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 793 (Conn. 2011) (finding intent and valid surrogacy
agreement was sufficient to allow for parentage rights even absent adoption); McDonald v.
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479–80 (App. Div. 1994) (relying heavily on intent based
approach of California Supreme Court). This approach has not gone without criticism. See
Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766–67 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (rejecting an intent-based
approach and finding lawful parents in a gestational surrogacy arrangement to be those that
provided the genetic material of the child).
60. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
61. Id. at 783 (alteration in original) (quoting Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 297, 397) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1740

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1729

The court was careful to articulate that any possible “evils” that
could arise from surrogacy arrangements were not present in this case
and noted that the legislature should be the proper avenue to address
such concerns.62 It also sidestepped a clause in the agreement that
would have allowed the Calverts to terminate the pregnancy.63 The
court was not persuaded by Johnson’s argument that surrogacy
contracts would exploit lower income women and treat children as
commodities.64 The court reasoned, “The argument that a woman
cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and a deliver a baby
for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for
centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and
professional status . . . .”65 California’s approach has commonly been
called the “intent test” for surrogacy contracts in that the intent of the
parties was the major factor in the court’s determination of parentage.66
III. ROSECKY V. SCHISSEL
Despite the increasing use of surrogacy contracts, it took over
twenty years for the question over the use of such agreements to reach
Wisconsin’s highest court. In January 2013, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court first addressed the enforceability of surrogacy contracts.67
Though there were no governing statutes or public policy statements,
the court had little issue finding that surrogacy contracts are enforceable
in Wisconsin.68 The only qualification was that such contracts could not
mandate termination of parental rights.69 The court held that, as long as
a surrogacy contract was a valid contract and did not conflict with the
best interests of the child, it would be enforceable.70 The difficulty for
the court appeared to rest in how such agreements fit within the existing

62. Id. at 784–85.
63. Id. at 784. The agreement specified that the Calvert’s had “sole right” to order an
abortion of the pregnancy. However, the agreement also states that the parties understood
the pregnant woman “has the absolute right to abort or not abort any fetus.” Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 785.
66. Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents
in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 A.L.R. 5th 567, 577–81 (2000).
67. Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634.
68. Id. ¶¶ 40, 74.
69. Id. ¶ 65.
70. Id. ¶ 30.
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statutory framework that governs legal custody and placement of a
child.71
A. Facts and Procedural History
Marcia Rosecky and Monica Schissel had been good friends since
grade school.72 They had participated in each other’s weddings, and the
Roseckys were the godparents to the Schissels’ daughter.73 As a result
of a medical condition, Marcia Rosecky was no longer able to have a
biological child.74 Schissel offered to carry a child for the Roseckys.75
The parties agreed to a traditional surrogacy where Schissel provided
the egg and David Rosecky provided the sperm.76
The parties each retained independent legal counsel and drafted a
surrogacy contract—titled a “Parentage Agreement” by the parties—
which stated the parties’ intent would govern the birth of the child.77
The surrogacy contract outlined a variety of areas for the pregnancy,
including the medical procedure to be used, contingencies if the
Roseckys were to pass away, requirements for Schissel’s conduct during
the pregnancy, and, most notably, requirements for parentage, custody,
and placement of the child.78 The agreement also included a severability
clause.79

71. See id. ¶¶ 40–43.
72. Id. ¶ 5.
73. Id.
74. Id. ¶ 6.
75. Id. ¶ 7. Schissel had made numerous offers to carry a child for the Roseckys in 2004
and 2008. Id. She would later testify “I offered to do this. . . . I orchestrated this whole
thing.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. ¶ 8. The Roseckys refused Shissel’s offer in 2004 but ultimately agreed to a
traditional surrogacy in 2008 after their attempts to secure an adoption failed. Oral
Argument at 15:30–16:05, Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634
(2011AP2166) [hereinafter Rosecky Oral Arguments], available at http://www.wiseye.org/Pro
gramming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?evhdid=7000, archived at http://perma.cc/TN4Q784P.
77. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 8; id. ¶ 80 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Rosecky Oral
Arguments, supra note 76, at 16:30–16:45.
78. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 10 n.2. The surrogate contract was extensive, and numerous
drafts were prepared and negotiated. Id. ¶ 8.
79. Id. ¶ 10 n.2. A comprehensive list of the provisions was provided in the full
Rosecky opinion. Id.
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The Roseckys and the Schissels had a falling out shortly before the
birth of the child, who the court identified as F.T.R.80 Schissel refused
to terminate her parental rights in accordance with the surrogacy
contract.81 However, Schissel did allow the Rosceckys to take F.T.R.
home following his birth.82 The trial court ruled it was in the best
interest of F.T.R. to remain in primary custody with the Roseckys and
for Schissel to be granted two hours of placement per month.83 The
circuit court ruled that the surrogacy contract was “clear and
unambiguous,” but the court also ruled it could not terminate Schissel’s
parental rights and refused to enforce the custody and placement
provisions of the surrogacy contract as well.84 Without Schissel
voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights, Marcia Rosecky was
unable to adopt F.T.R.85
A full custody and placement trial was later held to determine the
long-term custody and placement of F.T.R.86 Under Wisconsin law,
Schissel was presumed to be the mother of F.T.R., and an earlier
hearing had adjudicated David Rosecky as the father.87 The trial was

80. Id. ¶ 12. The Rosecky opinion describes the falling out: “It suffices to say that there
were several events resulting in hurt feelings and lack of trust among the parties.” Id. The
parties’ briefs elaborate that the tension developed as a result of the “unusual nature of
having one’s husband father a child with one’s best friend.” Respondent–Respondent’s Brief
and Appendix at 2, Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634
(2011AP2166), 2012 WL 6059328; Brief of Petitioner–Appellant at 4, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d
84, 833 N.W.2d 634 (2011AP2166), 2012 WL 5815880.
81. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 12. Schissel’s refusal to terminate her parental rights left her
as F.T.R’s mother under Wisconsin Statutes section 48.02(13). Id. ¶ 37.
82. Id. ¶ 12.
83. Id. ¶ 14.
84. Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation mark omitted). A court may terminate parental rights
of a parent upon voluntary consent of the parent. WIS. STAT. § 48.41 (2013–2014). Further,
grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are provided in section 48.415.
Reasons for involuntary termination include abandonment, a continuing need for protection
services, parental disability, failure to perform parental responsibilities, and more extreme
situations, such as parenthood as a result of sexual assault, a felony committed against the
child, or prior involuntary termination of parental rights for another child. Id. § 48.415(1)–
(3), (6), (9)–(10).
85. Joanna L. Grossman, A Matter of Contract: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules
Traditional Surrogacy Agreements Are Enforceable, VERDICT (Aug. 6, 2013), http://verdict.ju
stia.com/2013/08/06/a-matter-of-contract-the-wisconsin-supreme-court-rules-traditional-surro
gacy-agreements-are-enforceable, archived at http://perma.cc/J5Q5-HSK6.
86. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 18.
87. Id. ¶ 13. Absent such adjudication, Schissel’s husband would have been presumed
to be the father of F.T.R. WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1).
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conducted under Wisconsin Statutes section 767.41.88 Section 767.41
allows for a court determination of the custody and placement based on
the “best interest[s] of the child.”89 The statute also clarifies the factors
a court must consider in making such a determination.90 Further, the
statute mandates that both parents should be entitled to periods of
physical placement with the child unless “the court finds that physical
placement with a parent would endanger the child’s physical, mental or
emotional health.”91
The circuit court heard testimony from the Roseckys, Schissels, two
doctors hired by the Roseckys, one doctor hired by the Schissels, and
F.T.R.’s guardian ad litem.92 Most notably, the circuit court stated it was
“not going to consider [the surrogacy contract]” in its determination of
the best interests of F.T.R.93 The circuit court awarded primary
placement of F.T.R. to David Rosecky and an overnight placement with
Schissel every other weekend.94
B. Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the surrogacy contract
was a valid and enforceable contract under Wisconsin law as long as the

88. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 18.
89. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2).
90. Id. § 767.41(5). The summarized factors are (1) the “wishes of the child’s parents”;
(2) the “wishes of the child,” as communicated by the guardian ad litem or the child; (3) the
interactions between the child and the parents, siblings, and other persons who may affect the
child; (4) the “amount . . . of time that each parent has spent with the child”; (5) the “child’s
adjustment to the home, school, . . . and community”; (6) the age, education, and
developmental needs of the child; (7) the mental and physical health of any child who will live
with the child (8) the need for regular and meaningful physical placement for the child;
(9) the “availability of public or private child care services”; (10) the cooperation and
communication of the conflicting parties; (11) “[w]hether each party can support the other
party’s relationship with the child”; (12) any evidence of abuse; (13) any evidence of spousal
battery; (14) any alcohol or drug abuse (15) “reports of appropriate professionals”; and (16)
any other factors the court determines relevant. Id.
91. Id. § 767.41(4)(b).
92. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶¶ 17–18. A guardian ad litem is a court-appointed attorney
assigned to represent the interests of the minor. WIS. STAT. § 767.407(1), (4).
93. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 23.
94. Id. ¶ 24. A circuit court is authorized to determine custody and placement in a
paternity action under Chapter 767. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(1)(b). The Roseckys appealed the
case to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 25. The court of appeals
subsequently certified to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide the enforceability of the
surrogacy contract. Id. ¶ 26.
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contract was not contrary to the best interests of the child.95 However,
the surrogacy contract could not require a termination of parental
rights.96 The court noted that Wisconsin law was exceptionally bare with
regard to surrogacy contracts.97 Though a few statutes could be read to
contemplate surrogacy-like situations, the court conceded that the
statues provided no direct answer to the question of the validity of a
surrogacy agreement.98 Without statutory guidance, the court explained
it would analyze the enforceability of surrogacy contracts under basic
principles of contract law: offer, acceptance, and consideration.99
The court explained that Wisconsin has long recognized the freedom
of people to contract, even in unique ways.100 Further, when a contract
contains an invalid provision, courts accept the severability of that
provision as long as it does not “defeat the primary purpose of the
bargain.”101 This severability is especially respected when a severability
clause is expressly provided in the contract.102
The court concluded that the surrogacy contract at issue contained
the basic provisions of a contract.103 Despite the unique nature of a
surrogacy contract, it was “[n]onetheless . . . a contract and . . . [the
court] conclude[d] that it [was] largely enforceable.”104 The court noted
there was no consensus in other states regarding surrogacy contacts and
held Wisconsin had no public policy statements that were contrary to
the enforceability of such agreements.105 Further, the court described
95. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 30.
96. Id. ¶ 55.
97. Id. ¶ 40.
98. Id. The court stated that Wisconsin Statutes sections 69.14(1)(h) and 891.40 at least
contemplated scenarios with intended parents. Id. ¶¶ 40–42. Section 69.14(1)(h) is a
procedural law which provides for a modification to a birth certificate if a court makes a
determination of parental rights over a “surrogate mother.” See id. ¶ 41; see also WIS. STAT.
§ 69.14(1)(h). Section 891.40 provides that a woman’s husband is the father of a child even
when a woman is artificially inseminated from a sperm donor. WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1).
99. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 48. The court also noted that a surrogacy contract would
also be subject to traditional contract defenses such as “misrepresentation, mistake, illegality,
unconscionability, void against public policy, duress, undue influence, and incapacity.” Id.
¶ 57.
100. Id. ¶ 56.
101. Id. ¶ 58; see also Riley v. Leavit, 2013 WI App 9, ¶ 45, 345 Wis.2d 804, 826 N.W.2d
389; Schara v. Thiede, 58 Wis. 2d 489, 495, 206 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1973).
102. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 58.
103. Id. ¶ 59.
104. Id. ¶ 60.
105. Id. ¶¶ 63–64 & n.11. An example of a very clear public policy statement is
expressed in the Indiana Code. “The general assembly declares that it is against public policy
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that a finding that surrogacy contracts were enforceable was in the best
interests of society because
[e]nforcement of surrogacy agreements promotes stability and
permanence in family relationships because it allows the
intended parents to plan for the arrival of their child, reinforces
the expectations of all parties to the agreement, and reduces
contentious litigation that could drag on for the first several
years of the child’s life.106
The only portion of the surrogacy contract that the court found
invalid was the clause requiring Schissel to terminate her parental
rights.107 Wisconsin Statutes section 48.415 lays the groundwork that a
court may use for a finding of involuntary termination of parental
rights.108 The court found that under the current statute there was no
basis for such a termination based only on contract.109 The termination
of parental rights clause could be severed from the contract without
defeating the primary purpose of ensuring that the “Roseckys [would]
be the parents of F.T.R. and [would] have custody and placement.”110
The court closed its analysis by briefly dismissing Schissel’s argument
that the contract was void against public policy and calling for the
legislature to enact legislation to provide more guidance on surrogacy
contracts.111
C. Chief Justice Abrahamson’s Concurrence
Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote an extensive concurrence of the
court’s decision and was critical of the court with respect to its reliance
on contract law.112 She stated, “Courts should not sacrifice statutes or

to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement . . . .” IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (LexisNexis
2013). Indiana law goes even further to specify that a court cannot base a best interest of the
child determination on a surrogacy contract. Id. § 31-20-1‐3.
106. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 61.
107. Id. ¶ 65.
108. Id; see WIS. STAT. § 48.415 (2013–2014); supra note 90.
109. Rosecky, 2013 WI 65, ¶ 65.
110. Id. ¶ 66.
111. Id. ¶¶ 68, 73. During oral arguments, members of the court expressed concern
about the ramifications a decision limited to the facts of this case would have on surrogacy
contracts in the state. See, e.g., Rosecky Oral Arguments, supra note 76, at 12:05–12:35. The
court’s decision echoed the call from the parties that the legislature would hopefully create
guidelines to assist parties wishing to enter into surrogacy contracts. Id. at 12:39–13:00.
112. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶¶ 77, 82 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
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public policy considerations on the altar of freedom to contract . . . .”113
The chief justice was careful to note that surrogacy contracts are not
“standard run-of-the-mill contracts” and cautioned that courts should
carefully examine such agreements for public policy considerations.114
She particularly noted “baby-buying” and “exploitation of women” as
severe public policy considerations that, though not presented by this
case, are intertwined with surrogacy contracts.115
The chief justice characterized the court’s analysis as “carefree” with
regard to public policy considerations.116 She noted that the parties in
this case had a very comprehensive agreement that contractually agreed
that the best interests of F.T.R. would be served if the surrogate mother
did not have custody and physical placement.117 The chief justice further
cautioned that public policy considerations may not be as simple as the
majority suggested.118 She listed a variety of issues that remained
unanswered with the court’s broad acceptance of surrogacy contracts:
[M]ust the agreement be in writing; should compensated
agreements be allowed and what are the limits on compensation;
should the availability of surrogacy be limited to married couples
or infertile intended parents; should the age of any party be
limited; should a spouse be required either to consent or to be
made a party to the contract; must each individual involved be
represented by counsel; should the State require that
information about each individual’s legal rights be provided;
what provisions are valid regarding who makes decisions about
health care and termination of the pregnancy; how and when
may the agreement be terminated; and must any party to the
agreement be given the opportunity to change his or her mind
before or after the birth of the child?119
The chief justice stressed that such public policy issues must be
paramount when contracting for a child.120
113. Id. ¶ 78. The chief justice accused the majority’s decision of allowing “people to
contract out of the State’s traditional, statutory oversight role in the protection of children.”
Id. ¶ 77.
114. Id. ¶ 82.
115. Id. ¶ 98.
116. Id. ¶ 82.
117. Id. ¶ 83. There seems little question that the parties took every reasonable
precaution available. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
118. Id. ¶ 82.
119. Id. ¶ 82 n.2.
120. See id. ¶ 84.
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Chief Justice Abrahamson also cautioned that the court was
overriding aspects of Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 767.121 As noted
above, Chapter 767 lays out the relevant factors a court must consider
when determining the best interests of the child.122 The chief justice’s
concern laid in that the majority opinion suggested the surrogacy
contract would determine custody and placement rather than the factors
of Chapter 767.123 She accused the court of “placing . . . surrogacy
contract[s] above, and to the exclusion of, all other factors the
legislature has enumerated.”124
The chief justice criticized the court for treating children produced
via surrogacy differently than children born through traditional
means.125 She cautioned that custody and placement of the child should
be determined at the time of the court proceeding “irrespective of the
means of reproduction, through a wider lens, with emphasis on the best
interests of the child” as determined by the factors laid out in Wisconsin
Statutes section 767.41(5).126 The chief justice would have directed
lower courts to consider the surrogacy contract along with the relevant
factors proscribed in section 767.41(5).127
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES
A thorough analysis of the state-by-state approach to surrogacy is
beyond the scope of this Comment.128 However, a look at some of the
most recent developments in surrogacy legislation can provide useful
direction on how the Wisconsin legislature could provide much needed
guidance for parties seeking to use surrogacy contracts.
The United States does not have national policies directing
surrogacy contracts. As a result of the multitude of opinions on
surrogacy, it is not surprising that states have taken a variety of
approaches. Though some states prohibit or outright criminalize
surrogacy contracts, others have been very accepting of surrogacy
arrangements and reproductive technologies in general.129 The difficulty
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. ¶¶ 86–87.
Id. ¶ 87.
Id. ¶¶ 87–88.
Id. ¶ 119.
Id. ¶ 88.
Id. ¶ 97.
Id. ¶¶ 118, 126.
For a state-by-state survey, see Hofman, supra note 36.
See supra notes 35–36.
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lies in that a majority of states, just like Wisconsin, still do not have
legislation that addresses surrogacy.130
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act, as revised in 2002, provides
a model framework.131 The comment introducing Article 8 highlights
the differing opinions on surrogacy.132 The comment notes that the
Commission had failed to develop uniform laws over reproductive
technology that were accepted by the states.133 Article 8 attempts to
provide a framework. Most notably, Article 8 abandons the previous
approach used by the Commission that provided two alternative
approaches that a state could adopt: the first being a ban on gestational
surrogacy contracts and the second allowing such agreements with
certain conditions.134 In justifying this change, the comment preceding
the article explains that reproductive technology has reached such a
level that it will continue to be utilized, and such agreements between
desiring parents and surrogate mothers will continue to be written.135
Even if a state has banned such agreements, there remains a great
likelihood that a state court will eventually need to make parental
determinations as medical technology continues to advance.136
Article 8 allows for gestational surrogacy contracts provided certain
criteria are met. The article requires that a court validate any surrogacy
agreement, or it will be unenforceable.137 The process is relatively
simple in that the parties seeking to validate such an agreement must
petition the court, provide a copy of the agreement, and attend a
hearing to determine the validity.138 The Article also outlines the
criteria that a judge must consider to find a surrogacy agreement valid.
The requirements include (1) ninety days of residency; (2) ensuring a
130. Surrogacy Laws in the United States, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 4, 2012), htt
p://www.jsonline.com/news/health/163772546.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RP3C-L9DD.
131. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. (Supp.) 81–82
(Supp. 2014).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 801 cmt. Even prior to the introduction of Article 8, some courts, most
notably California, had already interpreted provisions of the UPA to apply to surrogacy
contracts. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993) (interpreting UPA, codified as
California Civil Code sections 7000–7002, as applying to all parentage determinations even
though surrogacy was not specified).
135. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. (Supp.) 81–82
(Supp. 2014).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 801(c).
138. See id. §§ 801–03.
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home study inspection of the intending parent or parents; (3) ensuring
“all parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement”; (4) verifying
adequate healthcare provisions have been made; and, if necessary,
(5) ensuring any compensation paid to the surrogate mother is
reasonable.139
Some states, such as California, allow for surrogacy contracts with
very few requirements. The parties must be identified; a disclosure of
how the intending parents will cover medical expenses must be made;
the parties must be represented by separate counsel; and the agreement
must be executed prior to any procedures.140 If an agreements meets
these largely procedural requirements, a court can then make a parental
determination before or after the birth of the child.141
Illinois also provides an example of legislation that governs
surrogacy contracts—though with greater restrictions. Illinois passed its
Gestational Surrogacy Act in 2004.142 The act governs gestational
surrogacy but remains silent on traditional surrogacy.143 The act
provides that if the requirements are met the intended parents gain full
custody at the time of the child’s birth.144 Under the law, a surrogate
mother must be at least twenty-one years of age, have had at least one
child, have completed mental health and medical health requirements,
and have retained the required health insurance and legal counsel.145
Gestational surrogacy contracts are presumed valid if (1) they are in
writing, (2) they are entered into prior to any medical procedures,
(3) the surrogate mother meets the eligibility requirements, (4) both
parties have separate legal counsel, and (5) both parties sign a form of
understanding in the presence of two witnesses.146
Further, the Gestational Surrogacy Act lays out the minimum
requirements for the surrogacy agreement.147 The agreement must
139. Id. § 803.
140. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)–(d) (West 2013).
141. Id. at § 7962(f)(2)
142. Act of Aug. 12, 2004, Pub. Act. No. 93-0921, 2004 Ill. Laws 3256. The act took
effect on January 1, 2005. Id. at 3266; see also Nancy Ford, The New Illinois Surrogacy Act, 93
ILL. B.J. 240, 240 (2005); Judith Graham, State Sets Standards on Surrogate Births, Legislation
Called Most Liberal in U.S., CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2005, at 1.1.
143. Ford, supra note 142, at 241.
144. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15(a) (West 2009).
145. Id. at 47/20(a). The Gestational Surrogacy Act appears to be modeled heavily
after the Uniform Parentage Act.
146. Id. at 47/25(b).
147. Id. at 47/25(c).
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expressly require the surrogate mother to undergo the required medical
procedure to allow her to carry the embryo.148 The surrogate mother
must also agree to immediately surrender the child to the intended
parent or parents immediately upon birth.149 The act also outlines that if
the surrogate is married her spouse must agree to undertake obligations
placed on the surrogate mother by the agreement and also agree to
immediately surrender the child.150 Conversely, the intending parent or
parents must expressly agree to immediately accept custody and
responsibility for the child.151 The agreement must also specify that the
surrogate mother may use the physician of her choosing during the
pregnancy, provided she consults with the intended parents.152 The act
creates a presumption that the agreement is enforceable even if the
contract contains provisions that require the surrogate mother consent
to certain medical procedures and evaluations, or refrain from certain
behaviors.153 The presumption exists even if the agreement allows for
reasonable payment to the surrogate mother for medical, professional,
or legal expenses.154 Finally, even if the requirements of the act are not
met, the court is still permitted to base a determination of parentage on
the intent of the parties.155
V. WISCONSIN’S PAST LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS
One of the most immediately apparent questions that arises out of
Rosecky is, Why has Wisconsin lagged behind in its surrogacy law? The
Baby M and Johnson cases were both decided over twenty years ago,
and there is no question that the use of surrogacy has only increased
since that time. The call for the Wisconsin legislature to act is not a new
concept; there have been calls for guidance for over thirty years.156
Surrogacy contracts, and ART, have produced underdeveloped and

148. Id. at 47/25(c)(1)(i).
149. Id. at 47/25(c)(1)(ii)
150. Id. at 47/25(b)(2)(i), (c)(2).
151. Id. at 47/25(c)(4)(i).
152. Id. at 47/25(c)(3).
153. Id. at 47/25(d)(1)–(2).
154. Id. at 47/25(d)(3)–(4)
155. Id. at 47/25(e).
156. Laura M. Katers, Arguing the “Obvious” in Wisconsin: Why State Regulation of
Assisted Reproductive Technology Has Not Come to Pass, and How It Should, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 441, 441–42.
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complicated areas of the law.157 Legislators’ unwillingness to address
surrogacy has not prevented the practice from charging forward.
Wisconsin’s primary attempt at surrogacy legislation occurred from
1987 to 1989.158 The attempt at governing surrogacy grew out of the
Baby M controversy.159 Not surprisingly, several different bills were
proposed to address surrogacy.160 The first proposed bill attempted to
offer a balanced approach that allowed for surrogacy if statutory
requirements were met but banned payments for profit to the surrogate
mother.161 Similar to Illinois’s more recent Gestational Surrogacy Act,
the proposal mandated a minimum age, prior childbirth, and medical
and psychological evaluations.162 The proposal also would have placed
similar requirements for agreeing to the medical procedure and
surrendering of the child after birth.163
A second proposed bill would have banned all surrogacy
arrangements in the state. The original version of the bill would have
made any surrogacy punishable by up to nine months in prison and a
$10,000 fine.164 A special committee was formed in 1989 to recommend
legislation after extensive debate failed to reconcile the two conflicting
approaches. The special committee consisted of three state senators, six
state representatives, and seven members of the public.165 The
committee recommended a bill that (1) banned all commercial
surrogacy, (2) regulated non-commercial surrogacy contracts,
(3) criminalized non-compliance with such requirements, and (4)
required a court validate surrogacy contracts.166 The bill mandated the
157. Id.; see Thomas J. Walsh, Wisconsin’s Undeveloped Surrogacy Law, WIS. LAW.,
Mar. 2012, at 16 (reviewing legal landscape of surrogacy in Wisconsin prior to the Resecky
decision).
158. Katers, supra note 156, at 454.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 455.
161. Id.; RICHARD L. ROE, CHILDBEARING BY CONTRACT: ISSUES IN SURROGATE
PARENTING, LRB-88-RB-1, at 17 (1988).
162. ROE, supra note 161, at 17; see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(a) (West
2009).
163. ROE, supra note 161, at 17–18; Katers, supra note 156, at 456.
164. Katers, supra note 156, at 456.
165. Id. at 457; see LAURA ROSE, LEGISLATION ON SURROGATE PARENTING: 1989
SENATE BILL 270, RELATING TO SURROGATE PARENTING, BIRTH CERTIFICATES AND
MATERNITY, S. RL 89-15, at 5 (1989).
166. Katers, supra note 156, at 457. The committee bill was also the first proposal in
Wisconsin that would have mandated court pre-approval of surrogacy contracts, similar to the
UPA and Gestational Surrogacy Act. See id.
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surrogate mother be at least eighteen years old and did not require any
prior childbearing experience.167 The bulk of the bill focused on
maternity determinations for surrogacy and other ART procedures.168
Strangely, the committee did not mandate attorney representation
for the parties or medical or psychological evaluations for the surrogate
mother or intended parents. Unlike the avenue chosen by Illinois over a
decade later, the bill did not create strict requirements with regard to
termination of parental rights and surrendering of the child.169 Rather
the bill stated that custody, paternity, and abortion provisions of
Wisconsin statutes must be strictly followed.170 The recommended bill
garnered heavy criticism.171 When the bill was proposed in the senate, it
was met with the same divisions that had prevented prior proposals
from passing.172 After the two-year attempt to pass comprehensive
legislation failed, the debate was essentially shelved until litigation
forced a court to address the issue.
VI. AFTER ROSECKY
There is no doubt that the Rosecky decision is a milestone for
surrogacy in Wisconsin. However, Rosecky is just the beginning of what
will surely be a long line of litigation on surrogacy contracts, albeit at a
crawling pace. Prior to Rosecky, the legal landscape in Wisconsin was
simply barren on the issue; now, though we know surrogacy contracts
are valid on their face, endless questions remain to be answered. Only
through legislation can proper guidance be provided so that when
intending parents and surrogate mothers enter into agreements all
parties fully understand their responsibilities and have assurances their
expectations will be enforced by the legal system.
A. Unanswered Questions
The most glaring question that remains following the Rosecky
decision is whether the court undervalued the public policy
considerations as suggested by Chief Justice Abrahamson and if the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

ROSE, supra note 165, at 11–14; Katers, supra note 156, at 457.
Katers, supra note 156, at 457–58.
Id. at 457; see ROSE, supra note 165, at 11–14.
Katers, supra note 156, at 457.
See, e.g., id. at 458; Neil D. Rosenberg, Doctors Call Surrogacy ‘Baby Selling,’
MILWAUKEE J., Apr 14, 1989, at 2B; Editorial, Surrogate Mother Bill Ill-Conceived,
Unneeded, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 24, 1989, at 13A.
172. Katers, supra note 156, at 159.
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public policy question is as settled as the court pronounced. The
majority accurately stated that Wisconsin Statutes did not answer the
question and there was no public policy statement against
enforcement.173 The legislative history with regard to surrogacy
contracts shows that public policy was far from settled in Wisconsin, and
the obvious counter argument is that there are no clear public policy
statements that support surrogacy contracts.174 However, the debate has
largely quieted, and the court acknowledged that the debate is anything
but settled in the other forty-nine states. The court made a small leap to
quickly find surrogacy contracts are valid under public policy—but it is
difficult to fault it for doing so. Despite the slow crawl of the law, there
were no contrary statements or statutes in Wisconsin law, and the use of
surrogacy continues to grow in Wisconsin and throughout the United
States.175
Even with accepting the validity of surrogacy contracts, there remain
numerous layers and questions that must be answered. Chief Justice
Abrahamson succinctly noted that the court’s opinion varies in its
reading by alternating between suggesting that the “Parentage
Agreement” in this case was not contrary to statutes or public policy and
a broader reading that Wisconsin public policy supports surrogacy
contracts in general.176 At its narrowest, Rosecky could merely be
interpreted to mean that surrogacy contracts are valid for the purposes
of determining custody in conjunction with the best interests of the
child. However, the decision seems to be much broader in accepting
surrogacy contracts generally, though the limits remain unclear.177
The Rosecky case presented the benefit of a very comprehensive and
valid contract. Attorneys wrote the agreement; the parties were
separately represented; the agreement specified the best interests of the
child; no compensation was paid; and this was a traditional surrogacy

173. Rosecky v. Shissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 47, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634.
174. Despite the lack of clear public policy on surrogacy contracts, Wisconsin does have
an administrative statute that directs recording of parent information on a birth certificate for
a child born to a surrogate mother. WIS. STAT. § 69.14(1)(h) (2013–2014). Though this
acknowledges the existence of surrogacy, it appears a stretch to consider this a support of
surrogacy contracts.
175. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
176. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 82 n.2 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
177. The court stated, “No Wisconsin Statute or case contains a specific statement of
public policy contrary to the enforcement of this [Parentage Agreement].” Id. ¶ 69 (majority
opinion) (emphasis added).
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situation.178 It is not difficult to see the follow-on-issues that Chief
Justice Abrahamson warns must be considered. The Rosecky decision
does little to answer the question of what requirements must be met in
order for a surrogacy contract to be valid.
Further, this surrogacy contract dealt with issues arising out of
custody and placement.179 Surrogacy contracts touch on numerous
highly contentious areas such as adoption and abortion that Rosecky
simply does not address. Though the contractual analysis of the
agreement is an adequate approach to begin analyzing surrogacy
contracts, surely the unique nature of such agreements—the fact they
govern a child’s life—must mandate additional requirements.
The relationship between surrogacy contracts and the Chapter 767
factors remains unsettled. The court stated that surrogacy contracts
were enforceable only if they were not contrary to the best interests of
the child.180 By design Wisconsin Statutes section 767.41 considers a
multitude of factors, not all of which would be considered equally.181
Despite the apparent view that a surrogacy contract should be viewed as
merely a factor, the court’s language suggests that such agreements
could be placed above other factors and be paramount in a court’s
consideration, provided it is not outweighed by the other best interests
of the child factors.
B. The Need For Legislation
The difficulty with the Rosecky decision does not lie in its outcome.
Determining placement and custody under the best interests of the child
is the most appropriate avenue in place for the courts and complies with
the current statutory framework. However, this approach retains the
flaw of creating too much instability for families and children. It allows
for months or even years of litigation to pass, as was the case in
Rosecky,182 before determinations are made.183 The contrast is notable
178. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
179. Though the fact this was a traditional surrogacy case may have created a more
challenging case for purposes of custody and placement, gestational surrogacy presents other
more challenging questions.
180. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 30.
181. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(5) (2013–2014). See supra note 90 for a summary of factors.
182. F.T.R was born on March 10, 2010. Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 12. At the time of this
writing, the circuit court entered an order in this case as recently as March 2015. In re the
Paternity of FTR: Court Record Events, WIS. CT. SYS. CIRCUIT CT. ACCESS, http://wcca.wico
urts.gov/courtRecordEvents.xsl;jsessionid=38C4E730DF294EB7B30B7F00DF9852A4.render
6?caseNo=2010PA000042PJ&countyNo=11&cacheId=40A015B300B043AC40A8A68DC025
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when compared to a state such as Illinois where the parties’ intent, and
subsequent validation of the surrogacy contract, shields the families and
children from these concerns by answering such questions long before
the birth of the child.
The purpose of this Comment is not to present and discuss the
various arguments for and against surrogacy contracts or ART in
general. Rather, both sides of the argument must realize that the
Rosecky decision leaves the legal landscape governing surrogacy
contracts in a precarious position. Past attempts at legislation, the
diversity of approaches to surrogacy contracts, and the divisive political
landscape all suggest passing comprehensive legislation on surrogacy
contracts will be a difficult challenge. However, Rosecky leaves many
open-ended questions that should provide for common ground for all
sides to reach a compromise.
For those opposed to surrogacy contracts, the decision validates such
agreements and provides no guidance on limitations. Namely, the
decision provides no clarity if there is any distinction between
traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts, if commercial surrogacy
is permitted, or what the limits on such commercial surrogacy would be.
The common outcry of baby selling and exploitation of mothers will not
be remedied by a failure to act. At the very least, opponents should be
willing to argue for requirements such as Illinois’s twenty-one years of
age requirement or limitations on commercial surrogacy and payments
to surrogate mothers. Absent legislation the limits of what is acceptable
in surrogacy contracts will continue to remain open until courts make
individual determinations and the case law develops.
For those who support surrogacy contracts, the decision does little to
outline what requirements must be in place in order to ensure effective
family planning and the enforcement of parties’ expectations. Intending
families should not be confronted with outcomes such as “most likely
enforceable” or “probably” when considering family planning. There
should not be gray area with regard to the creation of a child.
Advocates for surrogacy contracts should advocate for requirements
and guidelines that assist in this vital family planning. As the California
Supreme Court aptly stated in Johnson v. Calvert, “[H]onoring the plans
9951&recordCount=1&offset=0&linkOnlyToForm=false&sortDirection=DESC (last visited
June 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3U6G-DGDF.
183. See Thomas J. Walsh, Surrogacy Law Still Uncertain, WIS. LAW., Mar. 2014, at 28,
31. Judge Walsh concluded that, from a legal perspective, traditional surrogacy remains too
risky in Wisconsin. Id. at 32.
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and expectations of adults who will be responsible for a child’s welfare is
likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for parents and
children alike.”184
C. Pre-Birth Hearings
Regardless of the limitations the legislature could enact on
surrogacy, or the nature of the requirements for surrogacy contracts, all
sides of the surrogacy debate should be willing to agree on a court
validation requirement such as the one in place in Illinois’s Gestational
Surrogacy Act and the Uniform Parentage Act. With a minor addition,
such hearings could be used to not only validate surrogacy contracts but
also conform to existing statutory framework and ensure the best
interests of the child are met. Pre-birth hearings serve the critical
purpose of resolving conflict before the child is born—surely this is in
the best interest of the child.
A court would first need to make a ruling on the validity of the
surrogacy contract itself. This validation would depend largely on the
requirements the legislature would put in place. For example, if the
legislature allowed surrogacy contracts but banned payments to the
surrogate mother beyond reasonable payments for medical and living
expenses, a court would be charged with ensuring any payments were
reasonable. Regardless of the requirements that potential legislation
would impose on surrogacy contracts, the validation requirement is
essential for ensuring the agreement meets legal requirements, all
parties understand their responsibilities, and all parties have clearly
expressed their expectations. Conversely, if the legislature chooses to
maintain the rule that the surrogate mother could not be forced to
terminate her parental rights—leaving open the possibility that
visitation could be mandated—this limitation could be clearly explained
to the intending parents so they could make an informed decision. The
minimal burden that validation hearings would place on the courts
would be a small price to pay for addressing potential issues in surrogacy
contracts before the inception of a child takes place.185

184. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Shultz, supra note 61, at
397) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Recent proposed legislation contemplates a similar type of hearing in the adoption
context when the biological parent agrees to terminate his or her parental rights. See Jason
Stein, Foreign Adoptions Evaluated, Proposals Follow Discovery of “Re-Homing” of Cildren,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 26, 2014, at 3A.
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Further, the legislature could similarly mandate a “best interests of
the child” analysis be a portion of the pre-validation process. An
approach that focuses on the intent of the parties could be nested within
the existing best interests of the child framework and would allow for
parentage determinations to be made before the birth of the child and
eliminate what would often be a distressing and confusing first years for
the child. The surrogacy agreement should be given a more prominent
position in such an analysis—not merely become the seventeenth factor
for a court to consider. More often than not, the best interests of the
child would be served by the intending parents who are going through
exceptional lengths to have a child. Such a hearing could incorporate a
similar analysis as is currently used under Chapter 767 to ensure the best
possible environment for the child.
Though it may seem counterintuitive to determine the best interests
of the child prior to birth, there would in reality be benefits to this
approach. A court-appointed examiner could evaluate the home
environment that the intending parents have developed in the same
manner as currently done under Chapter 767.186 By examining the
preparation of the intending parents, the court could validate the best
interests of the child and ensure issues were resolved prior to birth.
Additionally, provisions could be put in place for a follow up
examination to be conducted if a party believes some substantial change
in circumstances is necessary. All parties should be able to agree that
the best interests of the child would not include lengthy litigation and
shuffling between households. With a small change, the current best
interests of the child approach can be merged to include the intent of
the parties and ensure a child is immediately placed in a stable situation
upon birth.
It seems unlikely that the Wisconsin legislature will suddenly spark
an interest in surrogacy legislation, let alone pass a relatively
comprehensive legislative package such as in Illinois. Despite this, even
patchwork legislation that puts layers on the Rosecky decision would be
of benefit. The realities of medical technology, and the patchwork of
approaches used in other states, ensures that surrogacy is here to stay—
a failure to pass legislation will not change that fact. Parents, surrogate
mothers, and children should never be forced to spend the first years of
a child’s life under the tension and confusion of extensive litigation.
This is especially true when the parties have taken all available
186. See WIS. STAT. § 767.41.

1758

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1729

precautions and the turmoil is the result of a legislature unwilling to
clarify this growing area of the law.
VII.CONCLUSION
Surrogacy, and the use of surrogacy contracts, is an ever-increasing
reality in medical practice and the law. Unfortunately, the law in
Wisconsin has been too slow in addressing this reality. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s decision in Rosecky v. Schissel marked the first
substantial decision on the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. The
court ruled that surrogacy contracts were not contrary to Wisconsin
public policy and were generally enforceable, provided they were not
contrary to the best interests of the child.
Despite this much needed clarification, the decision leaves a
multitude of questions in place that can only be effectively addressed by
the legislature. The best interests of the child standard, though
consistent with Wisconsin’s current statutory framework, does little to
clarify either what the requirements of a surrogacy contract are or the
limits of surrogacy in Wisconsin. After Rosecky, the intentions and
expectations of intending parents are still left to multi-factor judicial
analysis. Even more disturbing is that parentage decisions will still
occur months or years after the child is born, resulting in conflict and
confusion for the child. The Wisconsin legislature should actively
pursue surrogacy legislation that builds upon the best interest of the
child by incorporating the intent of the parties in order to allow for a
parentage determination before the birth of the child.
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